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Bridges and Bandits on the Road to the New Jerusalem: A Study of the
Correlation Between Immigration and Terrorism
Abstract
In late January of 2017, President Trump signed an executive order banning non-American citizens
traveling into the United States from seven different countries. The title of the order was, “Protecting the
Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States.” As implied, the stated purpose was to limit the
number of immigrants in order to avoid future attacks. President Trump claims that the executive order is
necessary to ensure the effectiveness of the United States’ immigrant vetting procedures and thus,
protect the nation from terrorist incursion. For the order to serve a purpose, immigration must play a role
in terrorism. Thus, the essential point of disagreement is whether a connection exists between the influx
of migrants—especially those from terror-prone nations—and the occurrence of terrorist activity in the
receiving nation. In this study, we attempt to discover if a link exists between immigration from terrorprone nations and terrorism by examining the current literature and using data to analyze the levels of
immigration as well as the incidents of terrorism in six countries.
The hypothesis of this research project is that as countries receive increased levels of asylum seekers
from terror-prone nations they will experience a corresponding increase in the numbers of terror attacks
within the nation. Our basic premise is that immigrant flows form a social bridge, transplanting cultures,
ideologies, as well as individuals between the sending and receiving nations. Thus, we are seeking to find
out if there is a strong correlation between immigration and terrorism. The null hypothesis, then, is that
there is no correlation between immigration from terror-prone nations and the occurrence of terror
attacks within a particular nation.
Our research shows that, as predicted in our hypothesis, increased terrorism is linked to
increased migration from terror-prone nations and regions. The data from Germany and Turkey display a
strong positive correlation between asylum-seeker migration and incidents of terrorism. It is worth noting
that immigration alone is not enough to predict a rise in terrorist attacks. Rather, immigration is only one
of many factors that may lead to increased terrorism. However, it is our contention that immigration from
terror-producing regions is a significant predictor of increased terrorist activity.
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Introduction

I

n late January of 2017, President Trump signed an executive order banning nonAmerican citizens traveling into the United States from seven different countries. The
title of the order was “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United
States.” As implied, the stated purpose was to limit the number of immigrants in order to
avoid future attacks. Since the order took effect, people have argued against it, making
claims about religious discrimination, ethnic discrimination, and Islamophobia. Beyond the
religious and ethnic issues, though, remains the question of efficacy. President Trump
claims that the executive order is necessary to ensure the effectiveness of the United States’
immigrant vetting procedures and thus protect the nation from terrorist incursion. In this
way, he seeks to advance nationalist interests; his critics, meanwhile, assert that his actions
are unfounded. Many who oppose the executive order argue that immigration does not play
a role in the spread of terrorism, claiming that no immigrants from these particular
countries have carried out successful terror attacks on the United States. For the order to
serve a purpose, immigration must play a role in terrorism. Thus, the essential point of
disagreement is whether a connection exists between the influx of migrants—especially
those from terror-prone nations—and the occurrence of terrorist activity in the receiving
nation. While there are a great deal of speculations and unfounded assertions on the
possible link between immigration and terrorism, there have been few reliable,
quantitative studies researching this question. The purpose of this study is to ameliorate
the confusion caused by the dearth of research on this topic. In this study, we attempt to
discover if a link exists between immigration from terror-prone nations and terrorism by
examining the current literature and using data to analyze the levels of immigration as well
as the incidents of terrorism in six countries.

Literature Review
As the world grapples with the refugee crisis stemming from Syria and other war-torn
nations and destitute regions, one of the most contentious immigration policy issues is
whether increasing immigration will lead to increased terrorist activity. The rise of Islamic
terrorism with Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria over the last
several years and the recent terror attacks in Europe have brought concerns of importing
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terrorism through immigration into the minds of many policy leaders of western nations,
especially those nations that receive many migrants from the Middle East and other
traditionally Islamic regions.1
While there are many opinions on whether immigration causes terrorism and frequent
debates on the subject in the news and halls of government, most of these opinions are
supported by little more than anecdotal evidence.2 Until recently, little research existed on
the topic, and what did exist could not make strong claims on the politically polarized
relationship between these two phenomena.
Some experts claim that any connection between immigration and terrorism is illusory or
fabricated.3 Authors of this opinion point to the lack of data showing a connection and the
fact that immigration has been a significant issue long before the rise of terrorism in the
last several decades.4 One author even surmises that a connection between the two
phenomena has been promulgated with the intent of restricting immigration as an end,
rather than as a means to prevent terrorism.5 Another theory is that political leaders
naturally transform complex, divisive questions into simple policy positions. 6 Essentially,
the author argues that humans naturally substitute the “readiness with which [terrorism]
comes to mind as a proxy for the probability” of it occurring.7 In the case of immigration,
politicians and political pundits substitute the complex issues of immigration for simple
questions of national security by promoting a fictitious connection between immigration—
especially illegal immigration—and terrorism.8 However, psychological arguments that
individuals are inclined to substitute simple issues or complex issues by creating illusory
connections or that humans naturally treat immigration and terrorism as if they are
correlated without any justifying research is only significant if terrorism and immigration
are actually unconnected. This is not the case.
In fact, these views focus on how individuals make connections between immigration and
terrorism without even considering the possibility that a connection exists. These authors
silently discount several important research theories and studies that point to the opposite
conclusion. Namely, that migration is a means through which terrorism is spread to
previously unaffected nations and regions.9 However, not all migration is equally likely to
Colette G. Mazzucelli, “Secular States in a ‘Security Community’: The Migration-Terrorism Nexus?” Journal of
Strategic Security 9, no. 3, (2016): 21.
2 Vincenzo Bove and Tobias Bohmelt, “Does Immigration Induce Terrorism?” The Journal of Politics 78, no. 2
(2016): 572.
3 For example, see: Maria S. Saux, "Immigration and Terrorism: A Constructed Connection," European Journal
on Criminal Policy & Research 13, no. 1/2 (2007): 57-72; Mary De Ming Fan, "The Immigration-Terrorism
Illusory Correlation and Heuristic Mistake." Harvard Latino Law Review 10, (2007): 33-52; Mazzucelli,
“Secular States in a ‘Security Community’”: 16-27.
4 Saux, "Immigration and Terrorism: A Constructed Connection," 71.
5 Ibid.
6. Mary De Ming Fan, "The Immigration-Terrorism Illusory Correlation and Heuristic Mistake," Harvard Latino
Law Review 10, (2007): 34.
7 Ibid, 35.
8 Ibid, 33.
9 Bove and Bohmelt, “Does Immigration Induce Terrorism?” 572-588.
1
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lead to increased terrorism. A 2016 study showed that immigration, in general, was
positively correlated with a decrease in terrorist activity in the receiving nation.10 The
study also quantitatively demonstrated that over 30 years in 175 countries, an increase in
immigration from a nation with high levels of terrorist activity was positively correlated
with increased terrorist activity in the receiving nation.11 Therefore, there is an empirical
connection between immigration from terrorist-prone nations and the spread of terrorism
to the country receiving the migrants.
However, some qualitative studies suggest that this finding cannot be true because
refugees and migrants are unlikely to harbor terrorist sympathies as they are often
attempting to flee conflicts created by terrorist or other violent groups.12 While the
conclusion—that migration from terror-prone nations does not facilitate the spread of
terrorism—is empirically false, it is worth considering the relevance of the claim that
refugees and migrants would oppose, rather than support, terrorism.
First of all, even assuming that the mass majority of migrants have no intention of bringing
terrorism into other nations, it is still possible that some do intend to do so. Given the
damage even one such individual is able to inflict, the potential that a handful among
thousands of migrants may harbor terrorist sentiments is a significant concern.
Second, even assuming that most migrants are simply seeking a better life in a new nation,
it is still possible that their movement facilitates the spread of terrorism. Bove and Bohmelt
argue that the movement of migrants constitutes a physical link through which terrorism
can spread from the terror-prone nation to the receiving nation.13 International diffusion
and spatial dependency theories posit that regardless of the positive intentions of migrant
groups, they can become a vehicle through which terrorism spreads from terrorist-prone
nations to previously unaffected nations.14 Working in concert, international diffusion and
social dependency theories suggest that migrants form strong social networks and
diaspora communities that carry on the ideological, cultural, and ethnic heritage of their
native countries. In the case of Muslim migrants, for example, even if the views migrants
carry to their new countries are not in themselves radical or violent, the basic cultural and
religious heritage they transport is still the foundation upon which radical Islamic
terrorism is built. In essence, if the migrants are from a terrorist-prone nation, these
networks and communities transplant the intellectual and cultural factors that contribute
to the existence of terrorism in their native countries to their new country of residence.
Additionally, research shows that these tight-knit expatriate groups are easily exploited for
radicalization and recruitment by terrorists from their home country or culture.15
Terrorists can use communities of first and second generation migrants as hubs through
which to expand their reach into other nations and regions by radicalizing and recruiting
recent migrants, by using migrant communities to hide their presence in a foreign nation,
Ibid, 572.
Ibid.
12 De Ming Fan, "The Immigration-Terrorism Illusory Correlation and Heuristic Mistake," 33-52.
13 Bove and Bohmelt, “Does Immigration Induce Terrorism?” 575.
14 Ibid, 575.
15 Ibid, 575.
10
11
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or by using social capital built by the migrant communities to make ideological inroads into
the native population.
This concept is similar to the way any group might expand into a new area. The first step is
to identify a promising new location for expansion; the second step is to identify current
members of the group that already live in the area to help establish a foothold. However,
instead of trying to spread a particular store or social club to a new region, terrorists are
seeking to export their radical agendas to other nations. In this way, migrants are a vehicle
through which terrorism is transplanted to regions in which it is not native.
An example of this phenomena is Rinkeby, Sweden. Rinkeby is a neighborhood outside of
Stockholm that contains a large quantity of migrants from Muslim Africa and the Middle
East.16 Swedish police forces have identified the area as a primary recruiting ground for
Somalia-based Islamic terrorist groups, such as Shebab.17 While the Swedish Security
Forces consider the likelihood of an attack on Swedish soil as improbable, they are aware
that radicalized Swedish nationals and Sweden-based migrants are traveling abroad to
attend terrorist training camps and participate in acts of terror in foreign locales.18 This
example demonstrates that terrorist groups are willing and able to infiltrate migrant, nonnative populations and exploit their communities for radical ends—even if the migrants
themselves were not originally radical. Shebab has used this tactic so effectively that it has
been able to turn Sweden into an exporter of terrorism.
There are two additional considerations that make the potential for terrorist exploitation
of migrant communities especially concerning in the case of Muslim and Arab diaspora
communities. The first is that these groups are generally perceived as different from the
peoples of the western nations to which they migrate. Therefore, Muslim migrants are
commonly ostracized or perceive themselves as being ostracized from mainstream western
society and have limited opportunity for assimilation, especially in Europe.19 The second
aspect is related to the significant flood of immigrants that entered Europe as a result of the
migrant crisis in 2016. Western Europe, for example, has largely failed to assimilate nonCaucasian migrants.20 Research shows that terrorists view unassimilated peoples as being
especially susceptible to radicalization due to the feelings of discontent and alienation
fostered by their situation.21 Both of these considerations increase the possibility that, in
spite of the good intentions of the majority of migrants, terrorist organizations will
successfully manipulate the social networks migrants create to further their radical
agendas.
Given that migrant communities are easily infiltrated by terrorist operatives and exploited
for radicalization and recruitment, the question, as posed by Jozsef Kis-Benedek, is this: are
Robert Nicholson, “Swedish Open Immigration Policies - Correlation with Terrorism,” The Homeland
Security Review 4, no. 3 (2010): 194.
17 Ibid, 194.
18 Ibid, 194-195.
19 Ibid, 194.
20 Ibid, 193.
21 Jozsef Kis-Benedek, “Illegal Immigration and Terrorism,” Journal of Security and Sustainability Issues 5, no. 4
(2016): 457.
16
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terrorist groups willing and able to send their operatives into western nations?22 KisBenedek posits that while terrorist groups are able to send operatives into western
nations, they are not inclined to do so. He argues that sending operatives to Europe or the
United States is a risky and expensive procedure that,23 especially in the case of the Islamic
State, limits the group’s ability to accomplish its primary objective, which is to control Iraq
and Syria.24 He also argues that ISIS does not need to export fighters to Europe because it
actually imports converts from Europe to fight in Syria and Iraq.25 For example, over a twoyear period, the French government was tracking nearly a thousand French citizens who
traveled to Syria to fight with ISIS.26 Other European nations are seeing similar numbers of
their citizens fighting with ISIS in the Middle East.27 Additionally, there is no shortage of
lone-wolf style European nationals who are willing to target their own countries either on
behalf of or at the direction of the Islamic state.28 For example, the attackers in the Paris
attacks in 2015 were Belgian and French nationals.29
However, the author does point out that while it might usually be prohibitively risky to
send operatives into Europe from the Middle East, a situation like the migrant crisis in
2015 would change the incentives for terrorist groups.30 During the height of the migrant
crisis, 60 million people were forced from their homes, many thousands of these migrants
and refugees streamed into Europe without undergoing any significant security checks or
registration.31 In this type of situation, the risks of sending in terrorist operatives decrease
significantly. If the Islamic State is intent on attacking Europe, as the group has proclaimed
and adequately demonstrated,32 this would have been an ideal opportunity to send in
operatives.
An additional consideration is whether the modern terrorist groups’ use of social media
limits their need to physically enter foreign nations for recruitment and radicalization
purposes. The Islamic State’s extensive use of social media as a propaganda tool may limit
their need to use existing social networks among migrant communities as a stepping stone
into new regions. In fact, ISIS recruits many followers from western nations who have little
connection to ISIS other than through ISIS propaganda on the internet.33 Therefore, ISIS—
and similar terrorist groups—may not be inclined to send operatives into foreign nations
and use the internet instead.
While terrorist groups may use social media effectively, it seems unlikely that groups
engaging in an activity—terrorism—that requires high levels of trust and reliability
Kis-Benedek, “Illegal Immigration and Terrorism,” 455.
Ibid 456.
24 Ibid, 460.
25 Ibid, 461.
26 Ibid, 461.
27 Ibid, 461.
28 Ibid, 456.
29 Ibid, 456.
30 Ibid, 463.
31 Ibid, 463.
32 Ibid, 461.
33 Ibid, 456.
22
23
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between its operatives would induct members through internet transactions, sight unseen.
Research shows that social bonds between members play the most important role in
radicalization and recruitment.34 Given the potential for government monitoring and the
uncertain nature of online communications, it appears unlikely that terrorist groups would
recruit in foreign nations entirely through social media. However, if terrorist groups are
recruiting primarily among migrant groups of similar religious, ethnic, or cultural
backgrounds, that would still constitute a link between migration from terror-prone
nations and terrorism even if the interactions were mediated through social media.
As the non-European migrant “siege” of Europe continues35 and the terrorist threat to
Europe appears to loom larger every year,36 the question of immigration policy and the
existence of a link to terrorism has become an increasingly important issue for the United
States and European nations. Empirical research from 1970 to 2000 clearly shows that
immigration from terror-prone nations leads to an increase in terrorism in previously
unaffected nations.37 This finding is likely due to terrorists slipping in among refugee
population and terrorist groups exploiting migrant communities as footholds for new
operations and recruitment. Migrant radicalization is likely increased by poor economic
and social opportunities in the receiving countries and by a lack of assimilation in
general.38 However, in spite of the research to the contrary, debate on the relationship
between terrorism and immigration has continued. One of the arguments that prompts this
study is that Bove and Bohmelt’s findings only considered 1970-2000 and do not apply to
the modern, post 9/11 world. A similar argument is that the changing world circumstances,
including migration policies and social media, have fundamentally changed how terrorists
recruit and have also decreased their need and willingness to physically enter foreign
nations. If this claim is true, it might be reflected in a changed relationship between
immigration and terrorism since the time of Bove and Bohmelt’s research. While it is true
that Bove and Bohmelt’s study ended before the rise of ISIS and the 2015 migrant crisis in
Europe, this study intends to prove that in spite of changing world circumstances,
migration is still a vehicle through which terrorism is transplanted from terror-prone
nations to other regions and nations.

Hypothesis
Looking at recent events, it is obvious that terrorism is a problem. Since terror attacks,
much like any form of attack, are genuine threats to a nation’s security, correctly
identifying the source of terror is crucial to protecting the national interest. Politicians and
political leaders are quick to blame terrorism on one cause or another, with foreign
immigration being a popular target. However, such reflexive decisions may be unhelpful if
the cause of terrorism is misidentified. Therefore, wise policy decisions require an answer
Bove and Bohmelt, “Does Immigration Induce Terrorism?” 575.
Ana-Maria Bolborici, "The Immigration Crisis – Reflections Concerning the Crisis of European Identity,"
Social Sciences Law 9, no. 1 (January 2016): 39.
36 Nicholson, “Swedish Open Immigration Policies - Correlation with Terrorism,” 199.
37 Bove and Bohmelt, “Does Immigration Induce Terrorism?” 572-588.
38 Nicholson, “Swedish Open Immigration Policies - Correlation with Terrorism,” 193.
34
35
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to the question of whether increases in immigration lead to increases in terrorism. The
hypothesis of this research project is that as countries receive increased levels of asylum
seekers from terror-prone nations, they will experience a corresponding increase in the
number of terror attacks within the nation. Our basic premise is that immigrant flows form
a social bridge, transplanting cultures, ideologies, and individuals between the sending and
receiving nations. Usually this process is benign; however, when the migrants originate
from a terror-producing nation, they facilitate the transfer of latent conflicts and
extremism. They also mask the travel of terrorists, who hide like bandits among the lawful
population seeking asylum in the nation or city of refuge. Thus, we are seeking to find out if
there is a strong correlation between immigration and terrorism. The null hypothesis, then,
is that there is no correlation between immigration from terror-prone nations and the
occurrence of terror attacks within a particular nation.

Methodology
Six countries were selected (Germany, Turkey, Greece, United States, Canada, and
Australia) based on their immigration policies, proximity to terror-prone countries, and
their popularity as the country of destination for immigrants. For example, Germany was
chosen due to its open immigration policy and its popularity as a destination for
immigrants in 2015. Countries like Australia and the United States were selected due to
recent actions taken and policies enacted to restrict or constrain immigration. Turkey and
Greece were selected due to their very close proximity to those fleeing the Syrian crisis,
while Canada was selected for its very tolerant stance on immigration.
In order to examine the relationship between immigration and terrorism, it was necessary
to locate databases with appropriate statistics. The database used to find out the Inflows of
Asylum Seekers into each country from 2000-2015 was the International Migration
Database of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. The database
used to find out the number of Terrorism Incidents in each country from 2000-2015 was
the Global Terrorism Database.
After collecting the appropriate data for each country, numerous statistical tests could
finally be run for each of the six countries. The first step was to examine whether or not
there was a positive trend in inflows of asylum seekers from 2000-2015. The second step
was to examine whether or not there was a positive trend in terrorism incidents from
2000-2015. After establishing the nature of the trend of each variable individually, a
scatterplot was created for both variables together to examine the potential for a positive
correlation. Since the number of inflows of asylum seekers was in the hundreds of
thousands, it was necessary to scale the number down in order to align more with the
number of terrorism incidents, which were in the tens and hundreds.
Then a set of descriptive statistics was run that examined the mean and median for the
inflows of asylum seekers (by thousands). Another set of descriptive statistics were run
examining the minimum, maximum, mean, and standard deviation for the inflows of
asylum seekers (by thousands). A table is also included with the Pearson’s Correlation
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number and significance between the Inflows of Asylum Seekers and Terrorism Incidents.
A description of the p value, degrees of freedom, critical value for a one-tailed test, r, and
coefficient of determination are included in order to help highlight key facts that would be
needed in order to draw conclusions from the statistics run.
The last set of statistics run for countries was a linear regression for those countries where
there was a very strong linear correlation between inflows of asylum seekers and terrorism
incidents. Appropriate tables are included below in the “Results” section of our study. For
example, the ANOVA test was run and the F-test was examined in order to see if the null
hypothesis would need to be rejected. Also included is the predicted number of terrorism
incidents for countries if the number of asylum inflows was to increase markedly. There is
also an indication of the mean number of terrorism incidents within a 95% confidence and
prediction interval.
Lastly, an examination of the percent of asylum seekers in each of our six countries that
were coming from terror-prone countries was made. There was a tool in the International
Migration Database that allows for one to control the statistics for the country of birth or
nationality of asylum seekers. Based on the Global Terrorism Index, the number of asylum
seekers from the top 5 countries with the highest impact of terrorism (Iraq, Afghanistan,
Nigeria, Pakistan, and Syria) was examined in regard to their proportion of the total asylum
seekers in each of our six selected countries. The results from this in-depth study of a
certain variable are visually displayed in line graphs.

Results
Germany
The following two graphs compare the inflow of asylum seekers (on the left) with incidents
of terrorism (on the right) in Germany. The general trend of both lines shows an increase
after 2013, which indicates a potential correlation between both variables.
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The scatterplot below demonstrates a very strong correlation between inflows of asylum
seekers and terrorism incidents, with the key number being R2, which is 0.901.

Turkey
The following two graphs compare the inflow of asylum seekers (on the left) with incidents
of terrorism (on the right) in Turkey. The general trend of both lines shows an increase
after 2013, which indicates a potential correlation between both variables. However, there
was a marked decrease in terrorism incidents between 2012 and 2013 while there was a
steady increase of asylum seekers into the country during that time.

The scatterplot below demonstrates a strong correlation between inflows of asylum
seekers and terrorism incidents, with the key number being R2, which is 0.550.
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Greece
The following two graphs compare the inflow of asylum seekers (on the left) with incidents
of terrorism (on the right) in Greece. The general trend of both is quite different, which
indicates that the potential correlation between both variables is unlikely. The inflows of
asylum seekers only spiked in number between 2014 and 2015. However, there has been a
steady increase in terrorism incidents since 2010 - four years earlier.

The scatterplot below demonstrates a weak correlation between inflows of asylum seekers
and terrorism incidents, with the key number being R2, which is 0.005.
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United States of America
The following two graphs compare the inflow of asylum seekers (on the left) with incidents
of terrorism (on the right) in the United States of America. The general trend of both is
markedly different, which indicates that the potential correlation between both variables is
unlikely. The inflows of asylum seekers spiked between 2013 and 2014 but dropped back
down between 2014 and 2015. Terrorism incidents post-9/11 decreased significantly in
the U.S., and a steady uptick in incidents did not occur again until 2012.

The scatterplot below demonstrates a weak correlation between inflows of asylum seekers
and terrorism incidents, with the key number being R2, which is 0.093.
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Canada
The following two graphs compare the inflow of asylum seekers (on the left) with incidents
of terrorism (on the right) in Canada. The general trend of both is quite different, which
indicates that the potential correlation between both variables is unlikely. In fact, the
graphs seem to indicate a potential negative correlation between both variables. The
inflows of asylum seekers decreased until experiencing a steady increase between 2013
and 2015. Terrorism activity in Canada has never exceeded five total incidents per year,
and data is sporadic at best.

The scatterplot below demonstrates a weak, negative correlation between inflows of
asylum seekers and terrorism incidents, with the key number being R2, which is 0.061.
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Australia
The following two graphs compare the inflow of asylum seekers (on the left) with incidents
of terrorism (on the right) in Australia. The general trend of both is dissimilar, which
indicates that the potential correlation between both variables is unlikely. The inflows of
asylum seekers steadily increased from 2005 to 2012. However, terrorism incidents in
Australia have remained relatively low during that time period.

The scatterplot below demonstrates a weak correlation between inflows of asylum seekers
and terrorism incidents, with the key number being R2, which is 0.065.
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Summary of Data
As is clear from the data sets from Germany and Turkey, the strong linear relationship
anticipated between immigration and terrorism can be present in certain conditions.
Germany displayed the strongest correlation such that 90% of the variance in terrorism
incidents can be explained by the inflows of asylum seekers. Turkey’s correlation was also
strong to the point that 55% of the variance in terrorism incidents can be explained by
inflows of asylum seekers.39 Other than Germany and Turkey, every country shows a weak
correlation between asylum seeker inflow and terrorism incidents. Given that the f score
for Germany and Turkey exceed the critical value, we can say that this correlation is not
due to chance.
The question, then, is why Germany and Turkey display these uncharacteristically strong
correlations. Some potential variables could be proximity to terror-prone areas, the vetting
procedures used, immigration policy, or proportion of asylum seekers allowed in from
terror-producing countries. The variable most likely to exert the most influence is the
proportion of asylum seekers from terror-prone countries. Looking at this data as a percent
(percentage of asylum-seekers coming from Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Syria),
it is clear that Germany is far above other countries in terms of accepting migrants from
terror-prone areas since 2006. This finding would indicate that the proportion of asylumseekers from terror-prone countries is a strong predictor of future terrorist activity.
However, in spite of its numerous terrorist attacks, Turkey’s migration levels from terrorprone nations have not been outside the normal range of the other nations considered in
the study. A possible explanation for this phenomenon is that the terror attacks Turkey has
39

The level of risk for this study was p = .05.
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suffered are more closely related to its own internal policies and disputes, such as its
ongoing conflict with Kurdish militant groups. It is also possible that its attacks are linked
to its close proximity to terror-prone countries.

Analysis of Results
As predicted in our hypothesis, the data demonstrates that increased terrorism is linked to
increased migration from terror-prone nations and regions. This connection is most clearly
demonstrated in the data from Germany and Turkey, both of which display a strong
positive correlation between asylum-seeker migration and incidents of terrorism. The
terrorism-immigration link in Germany is exceptionally strong, likely because of its openborder policy during the refugee crisis of 2015, its status as a desirable location for
migrants due to its financial success, and its geographical proximity to terror-producing
nations.
The data from Turkey, on the other hand, has a weaker correlation between immigration
and terrorism and a smaller portion of migrants from terror-prone nations than Germany.
This finding likely indicates that Turkey’s terrorism is only partially caused by immigration.
The literature on this subject lends credence to the conclusion that terrorism in Turkey is
at least partially influenced by its geographic proximity to terror-producing nations
through the effects of spatial diffusion40 as well as the ongoing conflict in neighboring Iraq
and Syria. In fact, our hypothesis that immigration from terror-prone nations leads to
terrorism in the receiving country is based on the assumption that migrant flows perform
essentially the same function as a spatial link—or bridge—between nations. Where a
physical, geographic link already exists, it is fair to conclude that the diffusion of terrorist
40

Ibid, 573.
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activity and ideology would be less dependent on migrant flows and thus less correlated to
immigration.
The data from the United States shows a weak correlation between immigration and
terrorism. We posit that the United States is a natural outlier to the general pattern of
correlation between immigration from terror-prone nations and the occurrence of terrorist
activity. Thus, we would expect the data from the United States to neither confirm nor
disprove our hypothesis due to its anomalous characteristics. First, we would anticipate the
United States to be an outlier because it is intentionally targeted, regardless of immigration,
by terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. Terrorists, especially those of
Islamic ideological backgrounds, purposefully target the United States to a degree
experienced by almost no other westernized nation—with the notable exception of Israel.
Second, the United States has an exceptionally robust migrant vetting process—enabled by
its relatively remote geographical position—that effectively constrains the default
correlation between terrorism and immigration.41 Additionally, the strength of American
immigration controls and the physical distance between the United States and terrorist
hubs in the Middle East likely provide significant disincentive for attempted terrorist
infiltration. This situation is almost the exact opposite of the state of European nations
during the refugee crisis of 2015. Middle Eastern immigrants traveled a relativity short
distance, often over land, into a borderless Europe. The geographical proximity and the
almost complete lack of vetting and border control created an excellent opportunity for
terrorist infiltration into Europe.42 The United States was largely immune to the migrant
crisis because of its distant location and firm border controls. Given these two significant
departures from the global norm, we would expect—precisely as the data shows—that the
United States would demonstrate a deviation from the typical relationship between
immigration and terrorism.
The data from Australia shows a weak correlation between immigration and terrorism.
However, this finding is not unexpected given Australia’s appearance as an outlier. It is far
removed from terror-producing nations geographically, it has limited inflows of migrants,
and it has large areas of undeveloped land upon which migrants could settle, thus reducing
the potential for societal strife between migrants and native populations. Similar to the
United States, these significant peculiarities separate Australia from the global norm.
Additionally, Australia’s extremely low rate of terrorist activity limits the ability to
construct a meaningful analysis of its migrant inflows.
The data from Greece is intriguing because they have experienced high levels of terrorist
activity over the last several years, but at first glance, it does not appear to be related to
immigration. It is possible that the spike in the percentage of immigrants from terror-prone
nations in the early 2000s was an influence on the large increase in terrorist activity that
occurred during the late 2000s, specifically beginning in 2007. However, drawing
conclusions from Greece’s data is questionable because, though it is considered part of the
westernized, civilized world, the nation itself has essentially been terror prone since the
41
42

Kis-Benedek, “Illegal Immigration and Terrorism,” 457.
Ibid, 457.
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1970s. Beginning in the mid-1970s, Greece has experienced enduring, systemic terrorist
activity against their civic institutions.43 Most of this activity is perpetrated by
revolutionary guerrilla terrorist groups seeking to achieve various, though uniformly
leftist, political ends.44 The activity of Greece’s homegrown terrorist groups masks the
effects of immigration and makes it difficult to discern how much of its 2007-2011 spike in
terrorism was caused by pre-existing Greek extremism and how much by immigration
from terror-prone nations. That being said, the peaks in terror-prone immigration and
terrorist activity—though separated by time—are similar enough to lend support to the
idea that immigration played a role in the increased terrorist activity. Additionally, the
notion of a delay between the influx of migrants and increased terrorist activity is not
unsupported. Research suggests that radicalization of migrants is related to the
discontentment fostered by a lack of assimilation into the host nation.45 Thus, it is
reasonable to assume that migrant radicalization would not occur right away. The
percolation of sufficient levels of economic and social distress would take some amount of
time. This concept lends weight to the position that increased terrorism in Greece could be
related to a delayed instead of immediate response to immigration from terror-prone
nations.
Meanwhile, Canada’s negative correlation between immigration and terrorism further
reinforces our overall conclusion that it is immigration from terror-prone nations that
leads to the spread of terrorism to new regions and not simply immigration in general that
accomplishes this end. Existing research suggests that immigration itself is naturally
negatively related to terrorism unless the migrants originate from a terror-prone nation or
region.46 Therefore, Canada’s negative correlation between immigration and terrorism is
exactly what one would expect if our hypothesis was correct given its relatively low levels
of migrants from terror-prone nations.

Conclusion
Conflict, poverty, and adverse political environments over the last several decades have
prompted a significant rise in international immigration. Recent reports estimate that the
number of international migrants reaches well over 232 million.47 During roughly this
same period of increased migration, terrorism has become an increasingly prominent and
deadly phenomena. Whether these two factors are related is a matter of intense debate
wherever individuals meet to discuss issues of national and international concern.
Our research shows that, as predicted in our hypothesis, increased terrorism is linked to
increased migration from terror-prone nations and regions. The data from Germany and
Turkey display a strong positive correlation between asylum-seeker migration and
43

George Kassimeris, “Greece: The Persistence of Political Terrorism,” International Affairs 89, no. 1 (2013): 132.
Ibid, 138.
45
Nicholson, “Swedish Open Immigration Policies - Correlation with Terrorism,” 199.
46
Bove and Bohmelt, “Does Immigration Induce Terrorism?” 584.
47
Ibid, 572.
44
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incidents of terrorism. It is worth noting that immigration alone is not enough to predict a
rise in terrorist attacks. The data from Germany, the nation with the strongest correlation
between immigration and terrorism, simply indicates that migration from terror-producing
areas is a strong indicator of a rise in terrorist incidents. This is not to say that immigration
from terror-prone regions is the only factor giving rise to terrorism in receiving countries.
Rather, immigration is only one of many factors that may lead to increased terrorism.
However, it is our contention that immigration from terror-producing regions is a
significant predictor of increased terrorist activity.
The conclusion that immigration from terror-prone nations is related to increased
terrorism in the receiving country is not surprising. In fact, these results are exactly what
one would expect given the existing research on this topic. Thus, immigration is indeed a
physical link similar to a bridge that allows for the travel of the ideology, culture, and
bandit-like terrorist individuals necessary for the transfer of extremism from terrorproducing nations to previously unaffected regions. The value of this study is that it
confirms and supports earlier research, especially the research conducted by Bove and
Bohmelt, and demonstrates that the correlation between immigration and terrorism holds
notwithstanding changing world circumstances, including the recent immigration crisis.
Additionally, this research highlights the need for discerning immigration policies. In terms
of the potential for increased terrorist activity, immigration from a terror-prone nation is
not synonymous with immigration as a whole. A policy that misses this essential
differentiation risks incorrectly assessing a substantial threat of additional terrorist
activity.
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Appendix A: Descriptive Statistics
Germany
The following descriptive statistics demonstrate the mean, median, and standard deviation
for the inflows of asylum seekers for Germany. The data was divided up into quartiles to
help streamline the process of analyzing data. Also included are the results from the
Pearson Correlation test that was run. The key variable to note is the r, which is .949.
Further information critical to interpreting the results is included below the appropriate
table.
Statistics (by thousands)
2000-2003
N

Valid
Missing

4
12
72.25
75.00

Mean
Median

2004-2007

2008-2011

4
12
26.25
25.00

2012-2015

4
12
34.25
34.50

4
12
197.50
141.50

Descriptive Statistics (by thousands)
N
2000-2003
2004-2007
2008-2011
2012-2015
Valid N (listwise)

4
4
4
4
4

Minimum
51
19
22
65

Maximum
88
36
46
442

Mean
72.25
26.25
34.25
197.50

Std. Deviation
15.777
7.805
11.147
168.911

Correlations
Inflows Asylum Seekers

Terrorism Incidents

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (1-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (1-tailed)

N
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).

p <.05
df = 14
Critical Value for One-Tailed Test = .4259
r = .949
Coefficient of Determination = .901

Inflows Asylum
Seekers
1

Terrorism
Incidents
.949**
.000

16
.949**
.000

16
1

16

16
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90% of variance accounted for

Turkey
The following descriptive statistics demonstrate the mean, median, and standard deviation
for the inflows of asylum seekers for Turkey. The data was divided up into quartiles to help
streamline the process of analyzing data. Also included are the results from the Pearson
Correlation test that was run. The key variable to note is the r, which is .742. Further
information critical to interpreting the results is included below the appropriate table.
Statistics (by thousands)
2000-2003
N

Valid
Missing

2004-2007

4
12
4.75
4.50

Mean
Median

2008-2011

4
12
5.25
4.50

2012-2015

4
12
11.50
11.00

4
12
62.75
66.50

Descriptive Statistics (by thousands)
N
2000-2003
2004-2007
2008-2011
2012-2015
Valid N (listwise)

Minimum
4
4
4
4
4

Maximum

4
4
8
26

6
8
16
92

Mean
4.75
5.25
11.50
62.75

Std. Deviation
.957
1.893
3.697
32.449

Correlations
Inflows Asylum Seekers

Terrorism Incidents

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (1-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (1-tailed)

N
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).

p <.05
df = 14
Critical Value for One-Tailed Test = .4259
r = .742
Coefficient of Determination = .551
55% of variance accounted for

Inflows Asylum
Seekers
1

Terrorism
Incidents
.742**
.000

16
.742**
.000

16
1

16

16
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Greece
The following descriptive statistics demonstrate the mean, median, and standard deviation
for the inflows of asylum seekers for Greece. The data was divided up into quartiles to help
streamline the process of analyzing data. Also included are the results from the Pearson
Correlation test that was run. The key variable to note is the r, which is .067. Further
information critical to interpreting the results is included below the appropriate table.
Statistics (by thousands)
2000-2003
N

Valid
Missing

2004-2007

4
12
5.50
5.50

Mean
Median

2008-2011

4
12
12.50
10.50

2012-2015

4
12
13.75
13.00

4
12
46.75
9.50

Descriptive Statistics (by thousands)
N

Minimum

2000-2003
2004-2007
2008-2011
2012-2015
Valid N (listwise)

4
4
4
4
4

Maximum
3
4
9
8

8
25
20
160

Mean
5.50
12.50
13.75
46.75

Std. Deviation
2.082
8.963
5.188
75.504

Correlations
Inflows Asylum Seekers

Terrorism Incident

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (1-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (1-tailed)
N

Inflows Asylum
Seekers
1

Terrorism
Incident
.067
.403

16
.067
.403

16
1

16

16

p <.05
df = 14
Critical Value for One-Tailed Test = .4259
r = .067
Coefficient of Determination = .004
.45 % of variance accounted for

United States of America
The following descriptive statistics demonstrate the mean, median, and standard deviation
for the inflows of asylum seekers for the United States of America. The data was divided up
into quartiles to help streamline the process of analyzing data. Also included are the results
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from the Pearson Correlation test that was run. The key variable to note is the r, which is
.307. Further information critical to interpreting the results is included below the
appropriate table.
Statistics (by thousands)
2000-2003
N

Valid
Missing

4
12
50.25
50.50

Mean
Median

2004-2007

2008-2011

4
12
41.25
40.50

2012-2015

4
12
45.25
41.00

4
12
81.25
69.00

Descriptive Statistics (by thousands)
N
2000-2003
2004-2007
2008-2011
2012-2015
Valid N (listwise)

4
4
4
4
4

Minimum
41
39
38
66

Maximum
59
45
61
121

Mean
50.25
41.25
45.25
81.25

Std. Deviation
9.570
2.630
10.720
26.550

Correlations
Inflows Asylum Seekers

Terrorism Incident

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (1-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (1-tailed)
N

Inflows Asylum
Seekers
1

Terrorism
Incident
.307
.123

16
.307
.123

16
1

16

16

p <.05
df = 14
Critical Value for One-Tailed Test = .4259
r = .307
Coefficient of Determination = .094
9 % of variance accounted for

Canada
The following descriptive statistics demonstrate the mean, median, and standard deviation
for the inflows of asylum seekers for Canada. The data was divided up into quartiles to help
streamline the process of analyzing data. Also included are the results from the Pearson
Correlation test that was run. The key variable to note is the r, which is -.252. Further
information critical to interpreting the results is included below the appropriate table.
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Statistics (by thousands)
2000-2003
N

Valid
Missing

4
12
37.25
36.50

Mean
Median

2004-2007

2008-2011

4
12
24.50
24.50

2012-2015

4
12
29.25
29.50

4
12
15.25
15.50

Descriptive Statistics (by thousands)
N
2000-2003
2004-2007
2008-2011
2012-2015
Valid N (listwise)

4
4
4
4
4

Minimum
32
21
23
10

Maximum
44
28
35
20

Mean
37.25
24.50
29.25
15.25

Std. Deviation
5.377
3.109
6.131
4.573

Correlations
Inflows Asylum Seekers

Terrorism Incident

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (1-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (1-tailed)
N

Inflows Asylum
Seekers
1

Terorrism
Incident
-.252
.174

16
-.252
.174

16
1

16

16

p <.05
df = 14
Critical Value for One-Tailed Test = .4259
r = -.252
Coefficient of Determination = .064
6 % of variance accounted for

Australia
The following descriptive statistics demonstrate the mean, median, and standard deviation
for the inflows of asylum seekers for Australia. The data was divided up into quartiles to
help streamline the process of analyzing data. Also included are the results from the
Pearson Correlation test that was run. The key variable to note is the r, which is .249.
Further information critical to interpreting the results is included below the appropriate
table.
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Statistics (by thousands)
2000-2003
N

Valid
Missing

2004-2007

4
12
8.75
9.00

Mean
Median

2008-2011

4
12
3.50
3.50

2012-2015

4
12
7.75
7.00

4
12
12.75
13.00

Descriptive Statistics (by thousands)
N

Minimum

2000-2003
2004-2007
2008-2011
2012-2015
Valid N (listwise)

4
4
4
4
4

4
3
5
9

Maximum
13
4
12
16

Mean
8.75
3.50
7.75
12.75

Std. Deviation
4.425
.577
3.096
2.986

Correlations
Inflows Asylum Seekers

Terrorism Incidents

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (1-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (1-tailed)
N

p <.05
df = 14
Critical Value for One-Tailed Test = .4259
r = .249
Coefficient of Determination = .062
6 % of variance accounted for

Inflows Asylum
Seekers
1

Terrorism
Incidents
.249
.176

16
.249
.176

16
1

16

16
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Appendix B: Linear Regression
Germany
Because there was a very strong, positive linear correlation between inflows of asylum
seekers and terrorism incidents for Germany, a linear regression was run in order to
determine whether the correlation would continue into 2016 if numbers increased. In
addition, an f test was run to determine whether the differences between variables are not
due to chance. If the f value exceeds the critical value, then we can say that the differences
between inflows of asylum seekers and terrorism incidents are not due to chance. Relevant
information for interpreting results are provided underneath the appropriate table. Lastly,
further descriptive statistics are provided to round out the linear regression analysis.
Model Summaryb
Adjusted R
Std. Error of the
Model
R
R Square
Square
Estimate
1
.949a
.901
.894
3.857
a. Predictors: (Constant), Inflows Asylum Seekers By Thousands
b. Dependent Variable: Terrorism Incidents

ANOVAa
Model
1

Regression
Residual
Total

Sum of Squares
1889.502
208.248
2097.750

df
1
14

Mean Square
1889.502
14.875

F
127.027

Sig.
.000b

15

a. Dependent Variable: Terrorism Incidents
b. Predictors: (Constant), Inflows Asylum Seekers By Thousands

p <.05
df = 14
Critical Value = 4.60
F = 127
Predicted Number of Terrorism Incidents (if asylum inflows are 500,000) - 52
95% confidence interval for mean number of Terrorism Incidents – b/w 43 and 61
95% prediction interval for mean number of Terrorism Incidents – b/w 40 and 64

Predicted Number of Terrorism Incidents (if asylum inflows are 600,000) – 63
95% confidence interval for mean number of Terrorism Incidents – b/w 52 and 74
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95% prediction interval for mean number of Terrorism Incidents – b/w 49 and 76

Coefficientsa
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Model
1
(Constant)

Standardized
Coefficients

B
Std. Error
-1.537
1.247

Beta

Inflows
.108
.010
Asylum
Seekers By
Thousands
a. Dependent Variable: Terrorism Incidents

.949

t
-1.232

Sig.
.238

11.271

.000

95.0% Confidence
Interval for B
Lower
Upper
Bound
Bound
-4.211
1.138
.087

.128

Residuals Statisticsa
Minimum
.51

Maximum
46.17

Mean
7.38

Std. Deviation
11.223

-.611

3.457

.000

1.000

16

.965

3.575

1.217

.635

16

.28

22.83

5.93

6.430

16

-10.337

4.571

.000

3.726

16

Std. Residual

-2.680

1.185

.000

.966

16

Stud. Residual

-2.775

2.644

.101

1.180

16

-11.080

27.171

1.443

7.878

16

-3.986

3.602

.084

1.529

16

Mahal. Distance

.001

11.949

.938

2.943

16

Cook's Distance

.000

21.319

1.368

5.321

16

Centered Leverage Value

.000

.797

.063

.196

16

Predicted Value
Std. Predicted Value
Standard Error of Predicted
Value
Adjusted Predicted Value
Residual

Deleted Residual
Stud. Deleted Residual

a. Dependent Variable: Terrorism Incidents

N
16
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Turkey
Because there was a strong, positive linear correlation between inflows of asylum
seekers and terrorism incidents for Turkey, a linear regression was run in order to
determine whether the correlation would continue into 2016 if numbers increased.
In addition, an f test was run to determine whether the differences between
variables are not due to chance. If the f value exceeds the critical value, then we can
say that the differences between inflows of asylum seekers and terrorism incidents
are not due to chance. Relevant information for interpreting results are provided
underneath the appropriate table. Lastly, further descriptive statistics are provided
to round out the linear regression analysis.
Model Summaryb
Adjusted R
Std. Error of the
Model
R
R Square
Square
Estimate
1
.742a
.550
.518
71.346
a. Predictors: (Constant), Inflows Asylum Seekers By Thousands
b. Dependent Variable: Terrorism Incidents

ANOVAa
Model
1

Regression
Residual
Total

Sum of Squares
87105.112
71263.888
158369.000

df
1
14

Mean Square
87105.112
5090.278

15

a. Dependent Variable: Terrorism Incidents
b. Predictors: (Constant), Inflows Asylum Seekers By Thousands

p <.05
df = 14

F
17.112

Sig.
.001b
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Critical Value = 4.60
F = 17
Predicted Number of Terrorism Incidents (if asylum inflows are 100,000) - 274
95% confidence interval for mean number of Terrorism Incidents – b/w 160 and 388
95% prediction interval for mean number of Terrorism Incidents – b/w 83 and 465
Predicted Number of Terrorism Incidents (if asylum inflows are 600,000) – 537
95% confidence interval for mean number of Terrorism Incidents – b/w 290 and 784
95% prediction interval for mean number of Terrorism Incidents – b/w 246 and 827
Coefficientsa

Model
1
(Constant)

Unstandardized
Coefficients
Std.
B
Error
11.360
22.303

Standardized
Coefficients

Inflows
2.630
.636
Asylum
Seekers By
Thousands
a. Dependent Variable: Terrorism Incidents

Beta
.742

t
.509

Sig.
.618

4.137

.001

95.0% Confidence Interval for B
Lower
Bound
Upper Bound
-36.476
59.195
1.266

3.993

Residuals Statisticsa
Minimum
Predicted Value
21.88
Std. Predicted Value
-.589
Standard Error of Predicted
18.111
Value
Adjusted Predicted Value
20.09
Residual
-152.783
Std. Residual
-2.141
Stud. Residual
-2.808
Deleted Residual
-262.625
Stud. Deleted Residual
-4.093
Mahal. Distance
.029
Cook's Distance
.000
Centered Leverage Value
.002
a. Dependent Variable: Terrorism Incidents

Maximum
253.30
2.448
48.496

Mean
66.75
.000
23.531

Std. Deviation
76.204
1.000
9.385

352.63
162.698
2.280
3.109
302.433
5.385
5.993
4.151
.400

65.21
.000
.000
.008
1.536
.075
.938
.449
.063

84.236
68.927
.966
1.215
111.312
1.838
1.856
1.212
.124

N
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
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